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CASENOTE
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission: A New Approach To The
Takings Issue
INTRODUCTION
Under the Fifth Amendment, private property cannot be taken for
public use "without just compensation."1 The "regulatory takings issue"
concerns the extent to which governmental regulations can impact private
property. As the use of regulations for land-use planning and environmental protection has increased, the takings issue has become even more
important! The principle question is how far can the government go in
regulating usage before the regulation becomes an unconstitutional taking
of the land.3 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council4 is the latest Supreme
Court case to address the takings issue.
The Lucas decision represents a departure from the traditional
approach to takings by creating a categorical rule and a specific exception
to the rule. The categorical rule is without precedent and the Court's
justifications fail to clarify why it is necessary. The exception to the
categorical rule is also without precedent and is much too narrow to deal
with the complex problems faced by decisionmakers in a modern society.
FACTS
The Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) was passed by
Congress in 1972.' The CZMA was designed to encourage the states to
take actions to protect the United States coastal areas.6 In 1980, Congress
passed amendments to the federal CZMA which directed the states to
strengthen their coastal protection programs by "preventing or significantly reducing threats to life and the destruction of property by eliminating
development and redevelopment in high-hazard areas."7
The South Carolina Coastal Zone Management Act (the Act),
which limited development in "critical areas" of the coastal zone, was

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

U.S. Const. amend. V.
2 F. Grad, Treatise on Environmental Law §10.01, at 10-20 (1993).
Id.
112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992).
16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (1988).
Id. § 1452.
Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2904 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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passed in 1977." The critical areas included coastal waters, tidelines,
beaches and primary oceanfront sand dunes.9 Any development in these
areas required a permit from the South Carolina Coastal Council
(Council)"0 and construction of any habitable structure beyond the front
row of dunes adjacent to the Atlantic Ocean was prohibited." The 1977
critical area was relatively narrow, and implementation of the Act did not
stop shoreline erosion. 2
In 1986, the Council appointed a Blue Ribbon Committee on
Beachfront Management to study the continuing problems and to make
recommendations. 3 Pursuant to the study, South Carolina passed the
Beachfront Management Act in 1988.1' The 1988 Act widened the area
designated as critical but did not change uses permitted in critical
areas. 5 The critical area was widened to "encompass the distance from
the mean high watermark to a setback line established on the basis of the
'best scientific and historical data' available." 16
David Lucas and others began developing a residential area on
the Isle of Palms, a barrier island located just off the South Carolina
mainland, in the late 1970s.' 7 Lucas had lived on the island since
1978.'o In 1986 Lucas purchased two of the last four vacant lots in the
residential area and planned to build two houses, one for his family and
one to sell.'9 The land which Lucas bought, although not in an original
critical area, "is notoriously unstable."2 Following the 1988 redesignation, all of Lucas' land fell within a designated critical area.2' Under the
1988 Act, all "construction of occupiable improvements was prohibited." ' Lucas' plans to build on the land were directly impacted by the
1988 Act.
Lucas filed suit in the South Carolina Court of Claims based on
the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment.' He contended that the
prohibition against building constituted a taking because it eliminated all
8. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 48-39-10 to -220 (Law. Co-op. 1987).

9. Id. § 48-39-10(J).
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. § 48-39-130.
Id.; see id. § 48-39-10() for definition of "ocean front sand dunes."
Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2905 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id.
S.C. Code §§ 48-39-250 to -360 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2905,
Id. (quoting S.C. Code § 48-39-280 (Supp. 1991)).
Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2889.
Id. at 2905.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2889-90.
Id. at 2889.
Id. at 2890.
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of the value of his property and therefore compensation was required. 4
The validity of the Act was not at issue because Lucas claimed that "the
Act's complete extinguishment of his property's value entitled him to
compensation regardless of whether the legislature had acted in
furtherance of legitimate police power objectives."' The Court of Claims
found that a taking had occurred and ordered just compensation to be
paid in the amount of $1,232,387.50.'
The South Carolina Supreme Court, relying on Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,7 reversed the trial court and found that
no taking had occurred.' Lucas' failure to question the validity of the
Beachfront Management Act played a crucial role in the court's analysis.
"By failing to contest [the] legislative findings, Lucas concedes that the
beach/dune area of South Carolina's shores is an extremely valuable
public resource . . . and that discouraging new construction in close
proximity to the beach/dune area is necessary to prevent a great public
harm. " The Court found the Act to be a legitimate exercise of state
police power.3 Under Keystone and prior cases, no taking occurs when
a state acts to prevent a serious public harm.3' Therefore, the South
Carolina Supreme Court reversed the lower court and found that Lucas
was not entitled to compensation.32
Lucas appealed to the United States Supreme Court and certiorari
was granted. The United States Supreme Court overturned the South
Carolina Supreme Court and remanded the case. 3 Rejecting the state
court's reliance on the harmful use/police power analysis, the Court held
that when a regulation deprives a landowner of all beneficial or
productive use of land, it falls into a discrete category of takings law
which is not subject to the traditional case specific inquiry)" The Court
then set forth a narrow exception to the categorical rule based on
background principles of state property and nuisance law.3'

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
Id.
480 U.S. 470 (1987).
Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991).
Id. at 898.
Id. at 902.
Id. at 901.
Id. at 902.
112 S.Ct at 2902.
Id. at 2893.
Id. at 2900.
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BACKGROUND SECTION
Before taking a closer look at the Supreme Court opinion, the
history of the takings issue must be understood. Starting with Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon 6 through the 1987 "trilogy" cases37, the
United States Supreme Court struggled with the question of when the
regulation of private property becomes a taking.
The Court first addressed the issue of regulatory takings in
Mahon.m Justice Holmes acknowledged that, while "[glovernment hardly
could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be
diminished without paying for every such change in the general law,""
there are limitations on the government's power to regulate private
property.' The ability to regulate the uses to which private property
may be put are an inherent part of the police power of the state.
However, the police power is not unlimited and a regulation which goes
"too far" will be recognized as a taking of private property and compensation will be required."
Justice Holmes, while articulating the general rule, did not
explain the extent to which a regulatory scheme can impact private
property before it goes "too far." According to Mahon, a number of factors
must be considered. Whether or not compensation is required depends
on the facts of the particular case.42 Great weight should be placed on
the judgments of the legislature.43 However, the validity of a regulation
may be challenged if a property owner believes the regulation has
transgressed the acceptable boundaries of the police powers." For the
property owner, the extent of diminution of the property values which
occurs under the regulatory scheme in question is crucial to the takings
issue.4" Mahon stated that compensation is owed if the diminution in
value is great enough, but the Court did not clarify how great the
reduction in value must be. The relationship between legitimate state
interests and diminution in property values was also not clarified.

36. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
37. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.,
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) [hereinafter
Keystone]; First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304 (1987) [hereinafter First English]; Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825
(1987) [hereinafter Nollan].

38. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 413.
Id.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 413.

43. Id.
44. Id.

45, Id.
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The basic approach developed by the United States Supreme
Court after Mahon reflects the same considerations put forth by Justice
Holmes. Rather than developing a set formula for addressing the takings
issue, the Supreme Court's decisions have identified several significant
factors to be considered in each case.' The three most important factors
are the nature of the state interest, the economic impact of the regulation
on the property owner and the extent to which the challenged regulation
interferes with distinct investment-backed expectations.47 Prior to Lucas,
the takings analysis required a weighing of private and public interests.4m
In 1987, the Supreme Court revisited the takings issue in three
important decisions. The first, Keystone,49 expanded upon the basic
approach to takings developed since Mahon. The second case, First
English,' recognized that compensation could be due even for a
temporary taking. Finally, Nollan5 ' required a higher standard of review
for certain regulatory takings cases.
Keystone, 2 involving a challenge to Pennsylvania's Bituminous
Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act,' reiterated the basic
approach to takings which had developed since Mahon. The Court
reaffirmed that takings cases are decided by "engaging in essentially ad
hoc, factual inquiries,"5' considering several factors, including the
character of the government's action, the economic impact of the
regulation, and the interference with reasonable investment backed
expectations. 5'
The first part of Keystone's regulatory takings analysis involved
an inquiry into the nature of the governmental actions. In addressing the
character of the government action, the Court stated that "the nature of
the State's interest in the regulation is a critical factor in determining
whether a taking has occurred, and thus whether compensation is
required."' Regulations which are passed to protect the public are often

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
Id. at 124.
Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980).
480 U.S. 470.
482 U.S. 304.

51. 483 U.S. 825.
52. 480 U.S. 470.
53. The Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act required that a portion
of underground coal be left in place to prevent the surface above the mining activities from
subsiding. The Coal Company challenged the Act as a facial taking. The Court held that the
Act was a legitimate regulation and was therefore not a facial taking. Id. at 479.
54. 480 U.S. at 495 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)).
55. 480 U.S. at 495.
56. Id. at 488.
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not takings because there is a substantial public interest in preventing
activities which are similar to public nuisances. 7 However, in acting to
protect the public interest, the legislature is not constrained by the
common law doctrine of nuisance.' Instead, under Keystone, the powers
of the state are defined broadly." States may exercise their police
powers to protect "the public interest in health, the environment, and the
fiscal integrity of [an] area. " ' These interests clearly go beyond nuisance
doctrines.
One of the most important ways a state may protect the public
interest is through restrictions on the ways individuals may use their
property.6' The regulations need not be limited to activities which would
be nuisances under the common law.' Instead, land-use regulations
have been upheld which adversely affected or even destroyed real
property interests where the state legislature has reasonably concluded
that the prohibition of certain activities would promote the health, safety,
morals, or general welfare.' In other Words, if the regulation substantially advances a legitimate state interest, the Court often found that a
taking had not occurred."
The nature of the state interest comprises half of the inquiry. The
diminution of value and the impact on investment-backed expectations
constitute the other half. A number of cases, beginning with Agins v.
Tiburon.' have stated that a general zoning law which "denies an owner
economically viable use of his land"' effects a taking. However, none
of these cases were decided based on the economic questions, therefore
the relationship of the state interest and denial of economic use was not
clarified. Keystone also failed to clarify the relationship because the Court
found that the petitioners failed to show any significant deprivation of
their property rights.67 Thus, once again, the question was left unanswered.
First English" addressed the issue of temporary regulatory
takings and, in so doing, further restricted the power of the state to
regulate land-use. The First English Evangelical Lutheran Church owned

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 492.
Id. at 490.
Id. at 489.
Id. at 488.
Id. at 491.
Id. at 490, (quoting Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928)).
PennsylvaniaCentral, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978).
Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-61; Keystone, 488 U.S. at 492.
447 U.S. 255.
Id. at 260.
480 U.S. at 493.
482 U.S. 304.
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and operated a campground for handicapped children on a piece of
property alongside a river which served as a drainage channel for a
watershed area in Los Angeles County. 69 In 1978, severe flooding
destroyed the campground.' After the flooding, Los Angeles County
passed an ordinance which prohibited building in a designated flood
protection area which included the campground." The Church filed a
complaint claiming that the ordinance denied them use of their proper2
ty.
The Court held that compensation may have to be made for a
temporary taking even if an ordinance is later withdrawn. 73 Regulations
which deny a landowner all use of the property, even if temporary, are
not any different in their effect than a permanent taking.74 Later
withdrawal of such an ordinance is not a "sufficient remedy to meet the
demands of the Just Compensation Clause."' The holding in First
English extended additional protections to the private property owner and
further limited the police powers of the state.76 A government entity
may not simply withdraw the offending regulation; instead, compensation must be paid for the time during which the landowner was not able
to use the property.'
The final case decided in 1987, Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastal Commission,' requires that regulations which affect property rights through the
police power must substantially advance a legitimate state interest. 9 The
Nollans owned a piece of beachfront property and applied to the
California Coastal Commission for a permit to replace a small, existing
bungalow with a larger home.' The Commission granted the permit on
the condition that the Nollans grant an easement allowing the public to
pass across the beach portion of their property."1 The Court found that
the permit condition was not sufficiently related to a legitimate government purpose and, therefore, constituted a taking. 2
"

69. Id. at 307.

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 308.
73. Id. at 321.

74, Id. at 318.
75, Id. at 319.
76. The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 101 Harv. L.Rev. 119, 245 (1987).
77. Id.
78. 483 U.S. 825.
79. Id. at 834.
80. Id. at 827-28.
81. Id. at 828.
82. Id. at 841.
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In discussing the conditions attached to the permit, the Court
looked closely at the connection between the state interest and the means
used to promote that interest. An essential nexus must exist between the
state interest and the regulation promulgated to advance the state
interest.' The essential nexus requires that a prohibition on the use of
property must further the ends advanced as justification for the prohibition." If a condition on development is not clearly connected to the
harm resulting from development,' then the regulation may be a taking.
Nollan requires that regulations, at least in certain circumstances, be
carefully drawn to meet the interests of the state.
In the Lucas decision, for the first time, the Supreme Court
attempted to clarify the relationship between the interests of the
government and the interests of the property owner when a total
deprivation of economic value is claimed.
THE LUCAS DECISION
Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Lucas was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, and Thomas." Lucas
held that regulations which deprive a landowner of all beneficial or
productive use of land are not subject to a case specific inquiry (the
categorical rule)." The majority also set forth a narrow, exception based
on background principles of state property and nuisance law.' Justice
Kennedy concurred in the majority opinion but questioned the categorical
rule and the narrowness of the nuisance exception." Justices Blackmun
and Stevens wrote vigorous dissents, challenging both the categorical rule
and the nuisance exception.' Justice Souter filed a separate statement
questioning the wisdom of granting review because of unanswered
questions as to whether Lucas was in fact deprived of all economic or
beneficial use of his property. 1

83. Id. at 837.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 112 S.Ct. at 2888.
87. Id. at 2893.
88. Id.at 2900.
89. Id. at 2902.
90. Id. at 2904 (Justice Blackmun writing, '"Today the Court launches a missile to kill a
mouse."); id. at 2917.
91. While acknowledging that "the issue of what constitutes a total deprivation deserves
the Court's attention, as does the relationship between nuisance abatement and such total
deprivation," Justice Souter argued that the issues should not be confronted indirectly in a
case where the finding of total deprivation rests on questionable and unreviewed findings
by the state trial court. Id. at 2925.
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After briefly dealing with the ripeness of Lucas' claim,' the
Court addressed the 5th Amendment issue. Looking back to Mahon, the
Court acknowledged that takings claims are ad hoc, factual inquiries for
which no set formulas have been derived." The Court stated two
discrete categories of takings claims exist which are compensable without
the usual case-specific inquiry." The first category deals with actual
physical occupations of private property by the state.9 The second
category, into which Lucas' claim fell, includes those instances in which
a regulation denies all econoinically beneficial or productive use of
land.'
Citing Agins, among other cases, the Court found that the
categorical rule has often been put forth but the justification for the rule
had never been explained. ' The Court offered three possible reasons for
departing from the traditional approach of weighing public and private
interests. First, looking to Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in San
Diego Gas and Electric v. San Diego," Justice Scalia stated that one reason
for the categorical rule may be that total deprivation of beneficial use is,
from the landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a physical
appropriation." This justification equates regulations which deprive an
owner of beneficial use with physical invasions."° Therefore, the
analytical approach for both categories would be the same.
Secondly, the Court opined that if regulations leave a landowner
with no productive or economically beneficial use of the land, it is much
harder to assume that the legislature is simply "'adjusting the benefits
and burdens of economic life'" in a way which leads to the benefit of
everyone involved."0 ' The Court assumed that in the relatively rare
circumstances where the government action leaves the property with no
yalue, the owner is not benefited."m The categorical rule would not
92. Because the Beachfront Management Act was amended to allow for special use
permits in certain circumstances, the South Carolina Coastal Council, argued that the case
was not ripe for review. The amendments were passed after briefing and argument before
the South Carolina Supreme Court, but before a decision was issued. Because the South
Carolina Supreme Court did not address the issue of further administrative proceedings, but
instead ruled on the merits of the case, the United States Supreme Court decided that the
case was ripe for review. Id. at 2890.
93. Id. at 2893.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2894.
98. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
99. 112 S.Ct. at 2894.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. ld.
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undermine the functioning of the government because of the rarity of
situations in which the rule can be invoked."0
Finally, the Court stated that regulations which leave property
owners without economically beneficial or productive options for the use
of their land pose a greater risk that the government is pressing private
property into public service under the pretense of preventing public
harm." 4 These regulations, according to Justice Scalia, typically require
that land be left in its natural state."o The examples cited by the Court
present a mix of purposes similar to those in the South Carolina
statute106 Lucas stated that negative regulations and appropriations are
equivalent because many states have eminent domain statutes which
allow the state to either impose servitudes which prevent development
07
of private scenic lands or allow the state to acquire the lands outright."
Justice Scalia made no distinction between statutes which protect scenic
values and those passed for safety reasons. In fact, he seemed to view
them as all as a way for the government to force private land to be left
in a natural state. The majority opinion implied that the purposes of such
statutes are suspect.
After setting forth the categorical rule, the Court delineated a
narrow exception based on inherent restrictions which are either in the
title to the land itself or which are part of the background principles of
the state's law of property and nuisance."l~ The exception recognizes
that a regulation can deprive an owner of all economic or beneficial use
of property if the regulation duplicates the result the state or neighboring
land-owners could have achieved in court by suing under state nuisance
law.1' 9 Only in such circumstances will the Court find that compensation is not owed.
Justice Scalia mentioned background principles of state property
law but the discussion focused only on nuisance law principles. Relying
on the Restatement (Second) of Torts for guidance, Justice Scalia outlined
what the 'total takings' inquiry would require. 10 The factors to consider
are: 1) the degree of harm to public or other private property posed by
the anticipated activity; 2) the social value of the claimant's activities and
the suitability of the activities to the location in question; 3) the relative
ease with which the harm could be avoided by other measures taken by

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id. at 2895.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2900.
Id.
Id. at 2901.
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the government and the claimant; 4) a comparison of the proposed
activity to others undertaken in the area (conceding that changed
circumstances or new knowledge may allow the restriction of previously
allowed activities); and 5) the review of whether such similarly situated
landowners are allowed to continue the activity. 1
Turning directly to the facts at hand, the Court remanded the
case back to the South Carolina Supreme Court." 2 The Court noted that
the Coastal Council cannot simply rely on legislative findings that the
13
uses proposed by Lucas were inconsistent with the public interest."
Instead, the background principles of nuisance and property law which
prohibit the proposed uses of the land in its present circumstances must
be identified." 4 Only if the Council identified such principles, could the
Council claim that the Beachfront Management Act did not constitute a
taking of the Lucas property, even though all economically beneficial use
of the property was prohibited."'
The categorical rule represents an important change in takings
jurisprudence. In the past, the Court has always taken an ad hoc, factual
inquiry approach." 6 The Court repeatedly refused to establish a set
takings formula. While acknowledging the Court's historical reluctance
to adopt a formalistic approach," 7 the Lucas majority parted with
tradition by adopting the categorical rule. Both Justice Blackmun's and
Justice Stevens' dissents pointed out the categorical rule is not supported
by past precedent."'
In prior regulatory takings cases, the Court always looked first
to the nature of the state's interest because the takings analysis ultimately
requires a balancing of public and private concerns." 9 Justice Blackmun
argued that the cases in which the state's interest outweighed the private
interest depended not on whether some "residual valuable use" existed
but on whether the government interest was sufficient, given the costs to
the private landowner, to prohibit the activity. 20 Justice Blackmun
emphasized that the state has full power to forbid property use if it is
harmful to the public. 2' If this is the theory, then compensation cannot
depend on a showing of economic loss only, for then the property owner

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id. at 2902.
Id. at 2901.
Id.
Id. at 2902.
See supra text accompanying notes 46-55.
112 S.Ct. at 2893.
Id. at 2904, 2918.
See supra text accompanying notes 56-64.
112 S.Ct. at 2912.
Id.
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would have a "constitutionally protected right to harm others.'
The
categorical rule in Lucas effectively eliminates any consideration of the
state's interest in regulating the prohibited activity.
The majority cites several cases as authority for recognizing the
categorical rule in Lucas. However, none of the cases actually applied
such an approach. Agins v. Tiburon, cited by Justice Scalia, was the first
case to explicitly state that a regulation which "denies an owner of
economically viable use of his land" may be a taking." The Agins Court
also emphasized that, in the final analysis, the takings question required
a weighing of public and private interests."2
As recently as 1987, the Court rejected a categorical rule in favor
of the traditional ad hoc, balancing approach."2 In his Lucas dissent,
Justice Stevens argued that the Court has only stated in dicta that a
regulation is a taking if it denies an owner of all economically viable use
of his land."2 Property values have been a relevant part of the takings
analysis but have never been conclusive. In First English, the Court
implicitly rejected the idea that deprivation of all use automatically
equals a taking by remanding the case for consideration of whether the
ordinance in question, which prohibited the rebuilding of the camp, could
be justified as a safety measure. 27 The economic impact of a regulation,
before Lucas, has never been the sole focus of the takings analysis.
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment of the Court but
disagreed with the categorical approach."2 The state retains the ability
to regulate the uses to which property can be put under the police
power.129 If total deprivation is claimed, then the focus should be on the
reasonable expectation for the property." Here again, a balancing or
weighing of interests must be done. The purpose of the legislation and
the fit between the means and the ends of the regulation must be
examined to ensure that they accord with the property owners reasonable
expectations. 3 '
The Court's justifications for the categorical rule do not adequately explain why an ad hoc, balancing inquiry is not appropriate in
the case of a property owner claiming total economic loss. If state
regulations that create total economic loss are indeed like a physical

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id. at 2893; see also supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 56-64.
112 S. Ct. at 2918.
482 U.S. 304, 321-22.
112 S.Ct. at 2886, 2903.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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invasion, then it would seem that such regulations could be analogized
to the permit requirements addressed in Nollan 32 The easement in
Nollan was considered a type of invasion and the Court used a higher
standard of judicial review."a The same test could be appropriate for
regulations that deprive a landowner of beneficial or economic use.
The Court, while discussing the justifications for the categorical
rule, expressed concern that land use regulations are being used to escape
paying compensation when property is actually being pressed into public
service."M The nexus test in Nollan would assure that governments were
not using regulations to escape paying compensation by requiring a close
fit between the stated purpose of the regulation and the means employed.
A careful scrutiny of the justifications offered by the state would reveal
if they were legitimate health and safety concerns or whether indeed they
were something less. Justice Kennedy impliedly used this same approach
when he stated that the purpose of the state must be looked at in
connection with the reasonable expectations of the land owner. 35 "The
Supreme Court of South Carolina erred . . .by reciting the general
purposes for which the state regulations were enacted without a
determination that they were.., sufficient to support a severe restriction
on specific parcels of property.""
The nexus test from Nollan would address the concerns expressed
by the majority and also preserve the traditional approach of balancing
the public and private interests. The balancing approach is important for
two reasons. First, the courts can oversee the legislature to be sure the
state meets the Nollan test. Second, the balancing approach also gives the
legislature the flexibility to meet changing situations, especially in the
environmental area. The development of a factual record about the public
interest, i.e. health, safety and welfare concerns, and about the reasonableness of the owners expectations (as well as the value of the property),
is not possible without the balancing test. As Justice Stevens observed,
the interests of fairness ind justice, which underlay the takings clause, are
not serviced by categorical rules. 37
The exception to the categorical rule, as set forth by the Court, is
unsupported by past precedent and is too narrow to meet the changing
demands of a complex society. The use of common law nuisance as the
basis of the state's power to regulate was rejected early in the 20th

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See supra text accompanying notes 78-85.
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 832.
Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2895.
Id. at 2903.
Id. at 2903-2904.
Id. at 2922
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century."3 The prevention of nuisance is an important part of the state
power to regulate, but it is not, as Justice Kennedy points out, "the sole
source of state authority to impose severe restrictions."139 In the past,
legislatures have not been bound by the narrow confines of nuisance law
in determining what activities they can regulate. In fact, the Court has
specifically rejected such an approach and all of the recent cases have
identified a broad range of governmental powers under the general
heading of health, safety and welfare."4
Traditionally, the regulatory takings analysis has been deferential
to legislative decisions about the appropriate approach to land-use and
zoning problems.141 Over 88 years ago, the Court stated that if the
validity of legislative decisions was "fairly debatable, the legislative
judgment must be allowed to control."0'4 The burden has always been
on the plaintiffs challenging a regulation to establish that the regulation
is unconstitutional. 4 3 In Mahon, Justice Holmes indicated that the
burden rested on those challenging the ordinance when he stated that
property owner has the right to challenge the validity of a regulation.'"
The presumption is in favor of validity. The challenger must prove
otherwise. Deference to the legislature recognizes that legislative decisionmakers are in the best position to develop workable solutions to local
problems.
The categorical rule, on the other hand, shifts the burden to the
government to prove that a taking has not occurred.'" The exception
also undermines the deference which is usually shown to legislative
decisions in the area of land-use planning. If a total taking is claimed, the
state cannot rely solely on legislative findings." Instead the state must
identify "background principles" of state law which support the action or
regulation. 7 Justice Blackmun questioned the wisdom of shifting the
burden to the state, asserting "[tihe Court offers no justification for4 its
sudden hostility toward state legislators, and I doubt that it could.0 8
Justice Blackmun also points out that the exception, on a practical
level, makes little sense.Y19 There is nothing magic about common law
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112 S.Ct. at 2909.
260 U.S. at 413.
112 S.Ct. at 2909.
Id. at 2909.
Id. at 2901-02.
Id.
Id. at 2913.

LUCAS V. SOUTH CAROLINA

Spring 19941

nuisance." Nuisance law requires that a court determine what activities are harmful, exactly the approach that the majority rejects as
unworkable under takings analysis.15 "In determining what is a
nuisance at common law, state courts make exactly the decision that the
Court finds so troubling when made by the South Carolina General
Assembly today: they determine whether the use is harmful." 52 Justice
Blackmun asks,
if "judges can distinguish harm from benefit, why not
'

legislators?'

5

The narrowness of the exception to the categorical rule is also
troubling. Justices Kennedy, Stevens, and Blackmun all expressed concern
that the exception would make it very difficult for government decisionmakers to pass laws which will effectively address growing environmental and land-use problems."s Justice Kennedy believes that the dependence on nuisance law will make it very difficult to address fragile land
system problems."s Takings law does not require a static body of law
in order to protect private interests. s6 Rather, flexibility is needed to
maintain a balance between public and private concerns. For example,
some lands, such as the coastal property regulated by South Carolina,
present such "unique concerns . . . that the State can go further in
regulating its development and use" than common law nuisance
principles would allow.'5 7 The government will not be able to protect
such areas if common law nuisance is the only remedy.
Justice Stevens viewed the nuisance exception as an unwise
attempt to freeze state common law."m The state must have the flexibility to meet changing circumstances as the understanding of property
rights evolves."s Statutes and regulations are frequently used to
"'remedy defects in the common law as they are developed, and to adapt
it to the changes of time and circumstances. ' " 6° The concept of property
and property rights has continually evolved over the course of the
country's history. 6' As Justice Stevens observed, slaves were once
considered property, but the country came to realize that slavery was
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morally wrong and the law changed."6 "On a lesser scale, our ongoing
self-education produces similar changes in the rights of property owners:
New appreciation of the significance of endangered species . . . ; the
importance of wetlands... ; and the vulnerability of coastal lands...,
shapes our evolving understandings of property rights."'( While some
changes in the law will create situations in which compensation must be
paid, not all changes in the common law should lead to a requirement for
compensation.'" However, strict application of Lucas could require
compensation for any common law change.
CONCLUSION
The long-term impact of the Lucas decision will ultimately
depend upon how courts interpret the categorical rule and the narrow
exception. If the holding in Lucas is indeed confined to those "exceptional"
cases where all economic value or benefit has been taken away, then the
effect of Lucas will be minimal. The majority opinion, on its face, clearly
limits the situations in which the categorical rule will be applied.
However, the Lucas case itself raises some factual issues as to whether or
not all economic value was indeed lost. Furthermore, the opinion's
footnotes could be used to broaden the application of the case, especially
where almost all, but not quite all, value has been taken away.' 6
Because of the ad hoc, and often confusing, nature of takings jurisprudence, the possibility of narrow holdings being applied in broader
situations is a very real concern.'"
At least one recent case, however, indicates that the Court will at
least try to confine the holding of Lucas. In Concrete Pipe and Products v.
Construction Laborers Pension Trust,' the Court rejected Concrete Pipe's
dependence on Lucas. The Court stated that Lucas applied only to the
"permanent physical occupation or destruction of economically beneficial
use of real property."'" In all other cases, such as Concrete Pipe, the
traditional analysis applies.'" Concrete Pipe may be a sign that the Court
is unwilling to expand Lucas to cover other takings claims.
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If the Court follows the course indicated by Concrete Products,
then the ramifications of the Lucas decision will be limited. State
legislators and decisionmakers will retain the flexibility needed to meet
complex environmental, natural resource and land-use management
problems. If the Lucas decision is read narrowly and a broader view of
the takings issue prevails, then legislatures and other decisionmakers will
have the flexibility they need to meet the demands of a modern and
complex society.
Lorraine Hollingsworth

